Double taxation agreements have existed in Latin America since the 1960s but have significantly increased in the last 25 years. The counterparts have been generally Western European countries. This article provides an overview of the historic and current trends in tax treaties in the region, with some hints about features of the agreements and the driving forces behind signing them.
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Latin American countries originally had territorial tax systems, which were gradually replaced by worldwide tax systems under which a credit is allowed for taxes paid to a foreign country.
For countries outside the region, entering into a double taxation agreement with Latin American countries was convenient, not so much to avoid double taxation — an outcome that could be reached unilaterally by granting a tax credit in the residence country — but to limit the source country’s taxing power, so that the loss of tax revenues in the residence country through a unilateral tax credit would be as small as possible. Developed countries sought to restrict the taxing powers of Latin American countries through a treaty by capping the withholding tax rates on source income or directly granting exclusive taxing power to the residence country.
For Latin American countries willing to attract foreign investments, entering into a tax treaty with capital exporting countries was convenient because a treaty was considered a signal that the country offered a favorable environment for foreign investments. Besides, the agreement normally required the developed country to agree to a tax-sparing provision, under which the residence country granted a credit for taxes a company should have paid in the other country had it not been for a promotional regime in the source country that exempted that income from taxation. Thus, the effective transfer of tax revenues between countries was avoided, and a promotional regime in the Latin American country really meant an alleviation of the global tax burden of the investing company. For those reasons, during negotiations for the execution of a tax treaty with Latin American countries, one of the main topics to discuss was whether a tax-sparing provision was included.
I have identified six stages in the development of treaties in Latin American countries:
- 1960s: predominance of Sweden;
- 1970s: opening of Brazil and regionalism;
- brief attempts at opening to foreign investments;
- 1990s and the expansion of the treaty network;
- the appearance of new countries in the 21st century; and
- blacklist of 2009 and OECD pressure.
Stage 1: Predominance of Sweden
The first treaty signed by Latin American countries dates back to the 1960s, when some countries of South America adopted a policy of promotion of foreign investment. The first country to sign a treaty with Latin America was Sweden, which signed with Argentina (1962), Brazil (1965), and Peru (1966). Argentina also signed a treaty with Germany in 1966, which Argentina terminated in 1972, and in 1967 Brazil signed treaties with Japan, Norway, and the United States. Except for the treaty with Peru, all agreements had a tax-sparing provision.
Brazil continued to sign treaties without interruption until 1991, and it signed 25 treaties with 23 countries in that period. That trend ended a little later in Argentina and Peru.
Stage 2: Opening of Brazil and Regionalism
Between 1965 and 1980, Brazil signed tax treaties with countries in Western Europe,1 the United States,2 and Japan. In an isolated action, the Dominican Republic signed a treaty with Canada in 1976. All those agreements approximately followed the OECD model and, except for the one with Portugal, included a tax-sparing provision. That was also the case with the Canada-Dominican Republic treaty.
That Brazilian policy was exceptional in Latin America, where mistrust or ignorance regarding treaties as a means to promote investments from developed countries still prevailed. Meanwhile, a regionalist position appeared in several South American countries, which would sign treaties only with countries of the same region.
The creation of the Andean Pact (Cartagena Agreement) in 1969 was the origin of Decision 40 in 1971, which established a multilateral treaty among Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (which joined in 1973). Decision 40 also included a model treaty to be used by the Andean Pact members in negotiations with third countries. In 1976 Chile and Bolivia signed treaties with Argentina that followed the Andean Pact model.3
The other Latin American countries for various reasons rejected all types of tax treaties.
Stage 3: Attempts at Opening to Foreign Investments
In a period with hard-to-define limits covering the second half of the 1970s and all of the 1980s, Brazil continued its campaign of treaty signing. Argentina, Ecuador, and Uruguay also signed treaties during short periods, generally with Western European countries. Argentina signed six treaties between 1978 and 1981,4 Ecuador signed four treaties between 1982 and 1984,5 and Uruguay signed three treaties in 1987, 1988, and 1991.6
After consolidating its tax treaty network with Western European countries, Brazil expanded it to include other regions. It signed agreements with Latin American countries (Argentina in 1980 and Ecuador in 1983), Eastern European countries,7 Asian countries,8 Canada (1984), and the Netherlands (1990).
Most treaties signed by Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay followed the OECD model.9 Almost all those signed by Brazil included a tax-sparing provision; the only countries that refused to include that kind of provision were Argentina and China. In most cases, the tax-sparing provision was for the sole benefit of Brazil.10 Germany also granted a unilateral tax-sparing provision to Argentina, Ecuador, and Uruguay, and Argentina obtained unilateral tax-sparing provisions from France and Italy. Low bargaining power or even inexperience of the signatory country probably accounted for the absence of the tax-sparing provision in the other treaties signed in that period. The Argentina-Brazil treaty has no tax-sparing provision, because of the paradoxical situation that both countries wanted to have one but neither was willing to grant it to the other.
Stage 4: Expansion of the Treaty Network
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, several Latin American countries decided to open their economies to foreign investment, which was paralleled by a process of signing tax treaties. That happened in Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina, which started a campaign to sign treaties in 1991-1992. Chile began its negotiations in 1993 and began to sign tax agreements in 1998.11 Those treaties followed the OECD or U.N. model. The Andean Pact model was abandoned, even for treaties between Latin American countries.
In the treaties signed up to 1996, Western European countries were generally willing to grant a unilateral tax-sparing provision to Latin American countries but had begun to have misgivings about it.12 Since 1996 there have been no treaties with a tax-sparing provision. That is likely the reason that in 1991 Brazil ceased signing treaties, even though it had been active in signing treaties before: It had the tax-sparing provision as the backbone of its negotiations.13
A 1997 OECD report shows the reasons for the progressive disappearance of the tax-sparing provisions during the first half of the 1990s:
The large majority of the OECD Member countries are of the view that the provision of tax sparing is not an effective way to promote foreign investment and to promote national economic goals. These views have been reinforced by the overall disappointing experience of most Member countries and many economies in transition with the use of tax incentives: a trend well documented in a recent OECD publication entitled “Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment” (1995). Furthermore, recent experience shows that tax sparing provisions offer ample opportunities for tax planning and tax avoidance which undermines the tax bases of both the residence and source country.14
Even after the disappearance of the tax-sparing provisions, the campaign to sign tax agreements remained active until the end of the century.
In the 1990s the United States signed its only two treaties with Latin American countries that entered into force (Mexico in 1994 and Venezuela in 1999). It is possible that the abandonment of the demand for the tax-sparing provision facilitated those agreements, because the United States was the only developed country that had consistently rejected its inclusion in treaties.
This stage concluded by the end of the decade in Bolivia, Argentina, and Ecuador, while Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile continued to expand their treaty network into the next stage.
Stage 5: New Countries in the 21st Century
In the 2000s, Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile continued their campaigns to sign tax treaties; Cuba, Peru, Colombia, and Paraguay joined the region’s treaty network; and Brazil went back to signing treaties. The tax agreements signed in this period follow the OECD or U.N. model.
In 2006 Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina de Naciones), so the multilateral treaty applies only to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
Brazil suspended its pursuit of treaties in 2010. Ecuador resumed in 2011 after a decade without new treaties, and Venezuela suspended its pursuit of treaties in 2010 and resumed in 2014.
Argentina terminated its treaty with Austria in 2008, and its treaties with Switzerland, Chile, and Spain in 2012. It then signed new treaties to replace those with Spain (2013), Switzerland (2014), and Chile (2015).
Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Uruguay are actively pursuing tax treaties. Mexico is the most active in expanding its treaty network, and even reluctant countries recently agreed to sign treaties with Mexico (Costa Rica in 2014 and Guatemala and Argentina in 2015). During this stage, Latin American countries signed treaties with the Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, and Persian Gulf regions, as well as among themselves. Even Colombia, Cuba, and Peru, which had not been active in previous decades, signed treaties with countries in Western Europe.
Stage 6: 2009 Blacklist and OECD Pressure
By the end of the 20th century, the OECD had issued a report warning against the damage that tax havens could cause to member countries’ tax revenues.15 Two years later, it issued a report identifying Panama as a tax haven.16 After several years of research, the OECD established some guidelines for defining a tax haven based on exchange of information criteria.
In April 2009 the OECD issued a report that contained a blacklist of countries that did not meet the OECD standards and had not made any commitments to improve, and a gray list of countries that did not meet the OECD standards but had committed to changing their laws to do so. The commitments included signing at least 12 tax information exchange agreements or treaties with an exchange of information provision.
Under the new OECD criteria, Costa Rica and Uruguay were the only Latin American countries on the blacklist. Panama was on the gray list, and a few days later, Uruguay and Costa Rica moved to the gray list after making high-level commitments to reform their bank secrecy legislation and sign TIEAs or tax treaties with at least 12 jurisdictions that complied with the OECD standards of transparency.
Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay were the only Latin American countries on the gray list. That status led them to a vigorous campaign for signing TIEAs and treaties, which continued even after they were removed from the gray list for having met the commitments. Between 2009 and 2015 Uruguay signed 16 treaties with new countries, plus a treaty with Argentina almost exclusively about exchange of information, and a new treaty with Germany that replaced the existing one. Panama signed 16 tax treaties between 2010 and 2013 but has apparently lost interest in signing new agreements. Costa Rica initially opted for signing TIEAs, but then signed two tax treaties in 2014.
Several countries have signed treaties with Latin American countries.
Within the Region
The first tax treaty between countries of the region, Decision 40 of the Andean Pact, was a multilateral one. Decision 40 included not only a tax agreement between the Andean Pact members, but also the Andean Pact model treaty for its members to use in negotiations with other countries. Bolivia and Chile used that model to sign treaties with Argentina in 1976.17
Soon after the Andean Pact treaty and the two treaties with Argentina were concluded, Latin American countries began to sign bilateral treaties instead. Like its attitude outside the region, Brazil was a pioneer in signing treaties with Argentina and Ecuador in the early 1980s. The tax treaty between Ecuador and Mexico was signed in 1992, and in 1997 several treaties between Latin American countries were concluded, an approach that continues today.18 In 2004 Decision 578 of the Andean Pact [CAN] replaced Decision 40.
When the Andean Pact countries began negotiation campaigns outside the region, they realized the pact model was unacceptable for developed countries. Therefore, the series of tax agreements signed by Ecuador beginning in 1982 used the OECD/U.N. model, even with Latin American countries like Brazil. The same was true with the series of treaties signed by Venezuela (beginning in 1992), Bolivia (beginning in 1992), Peru (beginning in 2001), and Colombia (beginning in 2005). The obsolescence of the Andean Pact model was made evident by the fact that not even the 11 treaties between member countries and other Latin American countries followed it.
Mexico has the most tax treaties — 10 Latin American countries, only six of which are in force. Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru each have treaties with seven Latin American countries. All of Ecuador and Peru’s agreements are in force, while only six of Brazil and Chile’s are in force. Colombia and Argentina each have treaties with five Latin American countries. All of Colombia’s are in force, and only three of Argentina’s are. Bolivia has treaties with four Latin American countries, all of which are in force. Uruguay and Venezuela each have treaties with three Latin American countries; all of Uruguay’s are in force, while only one of Venezuela’s is. Finally, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, and Paraguay each have one tax agreement with Latin American countries, but those for Costa Rica and Guatemala are not in force. The remaining four Latin American countries — the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua — have no tax treaties with countries of the same region.
Geographic vicinity, language, and cultural affinities did not prevent disagreements or conflicts. The Mexico-Venezuela and Brazil-Paraguay tax agreements have never been ratified. Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Community in 2006, which automatically terminated the application of the Andean Pact treaty to it. Argentina terminated its agreement with Chile in 2012, and the new one signed in 2015 has not yet entered into force.
Latin American countries signed only 28 tax treaties between them, of which two never entered into force, one was terminated, and four are too recent to know if they will enter into force. There are only 21 intraregional treaties in force, an artificially low number because the Andean Pact treaty is multilateral. If that multilateral agreement were considered equivalent to six bilateral treaties, that would result in Latin America having 26 treaties in force. Because Latin America includes 19 countries, there is potential of 171 bilateral treaties among them; therefore, Latin America has 15 percent of its potential treaties in force. By contrast, in the European Union there are tax agreements between all its members. Evidently, the degree of Latin America’s treaty integration is much lower than the EU’s.
Outside the Region
For tax agreements with countries outside the region, several Latin American countries followed a pattern similar to the one within the region: They signed treaties with Western European countries first and then with countries of other regions. That is because until the end of the 20th century, Western European countries were the only ones willing to sign tax treaties that included concessions such as the tax-sparing provision.
Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, and Panama signed most tax agreements with Western European countries, but they are interspersed with agreements with countries of other regions, because the Latin countries signed treaties when countries of other regions were also willing to do so.
Spain has the largest number of tax treaties with Latin American countries, which is hardly surprising, given that the region is defined by the cultural heritage and economic ties with it. Spain has signed treaties with 15 Latin American countries, 13 of which are in force.19 The region consists of 19 countries, so only four do not have a tax agreement with Spain, two of which do not have agreements in force with any country.20 Besides the historic and cultural explanations and the growing influx of Spanish investments in the region (which could also be said of the United States, which has only two tax treaties in force), the regime of foreign securities holding companies (Entidades de Tenencia de Valores Extranjeros) in Spanish domestic law (enacted in 1995) is much more attractive for multinational companies wanting to invest in several Latin American countries through only one holding company. So that Spain can offer the widest treaty network of the region, its holding company regime could have prompted it to expand its tax treaty network in Latin America as much as possible.
Far behind Spain, second place is shared by three countries of different regions: Portugal,21Canada,22 and South Korea,23 with nine treaties each, all in force.
Following those countries, France and Switzerland each have eight tax agreements signed and in force with Latin American countries.24 Germany also signed treaties with eight Latin American countries, but because of termination or failure to ratify, only six are in force.25 Belgium and Sweden each have treaties with seven countries in the region, each with six in force.26 The United Kingdom has tax agreements with six countries in the region, all in force.27 Italy has treaties with seven countries, four of which are in force.28 Austria has agreements with six, four of which are in force.29 Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands have treaties with five Latin American countries, all in force.30 Finland has treaties with four countries in the region, all in force.31 Luxembourg has treaties with four countries, three of which are in force.32 Ireland has treaties with three, all in force.33 All together, Western European countries have signed 109 treaties with Latin American countries, 97 of which are in force.
The tax treaty network with Eastern Europe is much smaller. Russia has signed the most treaties with Latin American countries, with six, all in force.34 The Czech Republic has treaties with four Latin American countries, all in force.35 Other Eastern European countries have hardly any treaties with Latin American countries.
The United States has a curious record: It is the only country that has in force fewer than half the tax agreements it signed with Latin American countries. Despite having signed five treaties with countries in the region, only those with Mexico and Venezuela are in force. The U.S. Senate rejected the agreements with Brazil and Argentina,36 and the one with Chile has been pending approval for the last five years.37 The disagreement between the executive branch and the Senate is remarkable, especially because the same situation has occurred in very different times.
Only two member countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)38 have signed tax treaties with Latin American countries: Barbados, with four in force, and Trinidad and Tobago, with two.39 It is unsurprising that all of Barbados’s agreements are with coastal countries of the Caribbean, and that Trinidad and Tobago signed with two South American countries close to it. Despite the geographical vicinity, most CARICOM countries do not have any treaties with Latin American countries. The reason could be that CARICOM countries were included in the 1997 Mexican list of low-tax jurisdictions (jurisdicciones de baja imposición fiscal), which was the basis for similar blacklists in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. CARICOM countries still appear on those blacklists, and there is a lasting feeling of suspicion in tax matters between Latin American and CARICOM countries. Even Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, which signed tax agreements with Latin American countries, have been labeled tax havens by all the Latin American countries that use the blacklist system, except Venezuela (presumably because it had treaties with those countries before the blacklist was drafted).
A few Asian-Pacific countries have a significant number of tax treaties with Latin America. After South Korea, China has the most with six, five of which are in force.40 India has four, and Australia has three.41 Singapore has an active campaign to sign treaties with Latin American countries, and has signed four, only two of which are in force.42
In 2004 another group of countries, all in the Persian Gulf region, began to sign tax agreements with Latin American countries. The oil industry might account for the signing of treaties between the two regions. Of the 15 treaties between Latin American countries and Persian Gulf countries, 11 have been signed by Venezuela, Mexico, and Ecuador, which are oil-producing countries; the other four have been signed by Panama (two), Cuba, and Uruguay.43
Finally are two hard-to-classify countries, which are the only ones in their respective regions to have signed treaties with Latin American countries. Israel has three tax treaties, all in force.44South Africa has four treaties, three of which are in force.45
Double taxation agreements first appeared in Latin America half a century ago, but most of them have been signed in the last 25 years. From the beginning, Latin America has considered tax treaties as positive because they promote foreign investment, and as negative because they restrict the source country’s power to tax foreign investors. It is reasonable to think the negative aspect was a cause of the positive one.
Because of that point of view, until the mid-1990s the main concern in the negotiation of Latin American treaties seems to have been the tax-sparing provision. Once the provision’s usefulness was challenged, the provision was gradually abandoned. The exchange of information now appears to be one of the most important reasons to sign a tax treaty, given that some treaties have been signed only for the purpose of obtaining exchange of information (for example, the Argentina-Uruguay treaty).
The Latin American country with the largest number of tax agreements in force is Mexico with 55, followed by Brazil with 31, Venezuela with 30, and Chile with 25. The other Latin American countries do not have such a large number of treaties in force.
Western Europe has the largest number of treaties in force with Latin American countries at 97, headed by Spain with 13. It is followed by Canada (nine), Portugal (nine), South Korea (nine), Ecuador (seven), Mexico (six), Brazil (six), Chile (six), Russia (six), Colombia (five), and China (five). The United States, which could have a wide tax treaty network based on its economic influence in the region, instead has a very small one because of a combination of historic and current intransigence. The Latin American intraregional treaty network is small compared with the one in the EU.
Maximiliano A. Batista is a partner at Perez Alati, Grondona, Benites, Arntsen & Martínez de Hoz(h) and a professor of tax law at Torcuato di Tella University in Buenos Aires.
An earlier version of this article appeared (in Spanish) in the April 30, 2015, issue of Periódico Económico Tributario. The author would like to thank Richard Safranek for his valuable comments on this article as well as Luis Felipe Ferraz (Brazil), Mayté Benítez Chiriboga (Ecuador), Gonzalo Sosa (Paraguay), and José Chiarella (Peru) for their comments about their countries.
1 Sweden (1965 and 1975), Norway (1967 and 1980), Portugal (1971), France (1971), Belgium (1972), Finland (1972), Denmark (1974), Spain (1974), Austria (1975), Germany (1975), Italy (1978), and Luxembourg (1978).
2 The U.S. Senate rejected that treaty, in part because it had a tax-sparing provision.
3 The Andean Pact treaty entered into force in 1980, after Chile withdrew from the pact in 1976.
4 Germany (1978), France (1979), Austria (1979), Italy (1979), Brazil (1980), and the United States (1981). The U.S. Senate rejected the U.S. treaty.
5 Germany (1982), France (1982), Brazil (1983), and Italy (1984).
6 Germany (1987), Hungary (1988), and Poland (1991). The Uruguayan Parliament rejected the Poland treaty.
7 Hungary (1986) and Czechoslovakia (1986).
8 The Philippines (1983), India (1988), South Korea (1989), and China (1991).
9 The only treaty that did not follow the OECD model was the Argentina-Austria treaty (1979), an atypical combination of the Andean Pact model and the OECD model based on the exclusive taxation power of the source country, combined with caps on the withholding taxes that country can levy.
10 Spain, Ecuador, the Philippines, India, and South Korea had reciprocal tax-sparing provisions.
11 Costa Rica signed tax treaties with Germany in 1991 and Romania in 1993, and Paraguay signed one with Taiwan in 1994, but none of them entered into force.
12 For example, Belgium granted that provision in its treaty with Brazil, but not in those with Mexico (1992), Venezuela (1993), and Argentina (1996). Netherlands granted it in its agreements with Brazil, Venezuela (1991), and Mexico (1993), but not Argentina (1997). Spain granted the provision to Brazil, Mexico (1991), and Argentina (1992), but not Venezuela (2001).
13 The last treaty signed by Brazil during this stage (with China) did not include that provision.
14 OECD, “Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration” (1997), at 12.
15 “Harmful Tax Competition” (1998).
16 “Towards Global Tax Cooperation” (2000).
17 It is paradoxical that in the only two cases in which the Andean Pact model was used to sign tax treaties with third countries, it was not in force (it entered into force in 1980). Further, the agreement between Argentina and Chile was never in force because Chile withdrew from the pact a few days before signing the treaty.
18 Mexico-Venezuela (1997), Chile-Mexico (1998), Chile-Ecuador (1999), Brazil-Paraguay (2000), Brazil-Chile (2001), Chile-Peru (2001), Brazil-Mexico (2003), Cuba-Venezuela (2003), Brazil-Venezuela (2005), Chile-Paraguay (2005), Brazil-Peru (2006), Chile-Colombia (2007), Colombia-Mexico (2009), Mexico-Uruguay (2009), Mexico-Panama (2010), Ecuador-Uruguay (2011), Mexico-Peru (2011), Argentina-Uruguay (2012), Costa Rica-Mexico (2014), Guatemala-Mexico (2015), Argentina-Chile (2015), and Argentina-Mexico (2015).
The agreements between Mexico-Venezuela, Brazil-Paraguay, Costa Rica-Mexico, Guatemala-Mexico, Argentina-Chile, and Argentina-Mexico have not entered yet into force, and it is unlikely the first two ever will.
19 Brazil, Ecuador (1991), Argentina (1992 and 2013), Mexico (1992), Bolivia (1997), Cuba (1999), Venezuela (2003), Chile (2003), Costa Rica (2004), Colombia (2005), Peru (2006), El Salvador (2008), Uruguay (2009), Panama (2010), and the Dominican Republic (2011). The treaty with Peru (2006) was not ratified by Peru and has never entered into force. The 1992 treaty with Argentina was terminated by Argentina in 2012 and was replaced by a new one that entered into force in 2013.
20 Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. Paraguay has tax treaties in force with Chile and Taiwan. Guatemala has a treaty with Mexico that has not entered into force.
21 Brazil (1971 and 2000), Venezuela (1996), Mexico (1999), Cuba (2000), Chile (2005), Uruguay (2009), Panama (2010), Colombia (2010), and Peru (2012). Brazil terminated the 1971 treaty, which resulted in its replacement by a new one in 2000 without any interruption.
22 The Dominican Republic (1976), Brazil, Mexico (1991 and 2006), Argentina (1993), Chile (1998), Ecuador (2001), Venezuela (2001), Peru (2001), and Colombia (2008).
23 Brazil, Mexico (1994), Chile (2002), Venezuela (2006), Colombia (2010), Panama (2010), Uruguay (2011), Peru (2012), and Ecuador (2012).
24 France: Brazil, Argentina (1979), Ecuador (1982), Mexico (1991), Venezuela (1992), Bolivia (1994), Chile (2004), and Panama (2011).
Switzerland: Mexico (1993), Ecuador (1994), Venezuela (1996), Argentina (1997 and 2014), Colombia (2007), Chile (2008), Uruguay (2010), and Peru (2012). The 1997 treaty with Argentina was applied provisionally, and Argentina canceled its provisional application on January 16, 2012; the new treaty with Argentina entered into force in 2015.
25 Argentina (1966 and 1978), Brazil, Ecuador (1982), Uruguay (1987 and 2010), Bolivia (1992), Mexico (1993 and 2008), Costa Rica (1993 and 2014), and Venezuela (1995). Argentina terminated the 1966 tax treaty in 1972. Germany terminated the treaty with Brazil in 2005. The 1987 agreement with Uruguay was replaced by a new one in 2010. The 1993 treaty with Costa Rica never entered into force, and the new one signed in 2014 has not entered into force. Therefore, Germany has tax treaties only with Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
26 Belgium: Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador (1996), Chile (2007), and Uruguay (2013). The treaty with Uruguay has not entered into force yet.
Sweden: Argentina (1962 and 1995), Brazil (1965 and 1975), Peru (1966), Mexico (1992), Venezuela (1993), Bolivia (1994), and Chile (2004). The 1962 treaty with Argentina was replaced by a new one signed in 1995. The 1965 treaty with Brazil was replaced by a new one signed in 1975. Sweden terminated the treaty with Peru in 2005.
27 Mexico (1994), Bolivia (1994), Argentina (1996), Venezuela (1996), Chile (2003), and Panama (2013).
28 Italy signed tax agreements with Brazil, Argentina (1979), Ecuador (1984), Mexico (1991 and 2011), Cuba (2000), Panama (2010), and Chile (2015). The agreements with Cuba, Panama, and Chile have not entered into force.
29 Brazil, Argentina (1979), Cuba (2003), Mexico (2004), Venezuela (2006), and Chile (2012). Argentina terminated the treaty in 2008, and the treaty with Chile has not entered into force.
30 Denmark: Brazil, Argentina (1995), Mexico (1997), Venezuela (1998), and Chile (2002).
Norway: Brazil, Mexico (1995), Argentina (1997), Venezuela (1997), and Chile (2001).
Netherlands: Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, and Panama (2010).
31 Brazil, Argentina (1994), Mexico (1997), and Uruguay (2011).
32 Brazil, Mexico (2001), Panama (2010), and Uruguay (2015). The tax treaty with Uruguay has not entered into force.
33 Brazil, Mexico (1998), Chile (2005), and Panama (2011).
34 Cuba (2000), Argentina (2001), Venezuela (2003), Mexico (2004), Chile (2004), and Brazil (2004). Russia took an extraordinarily long time to ratify tax agreements with Latin American countries after signing them (six years for Venezuela, eight years for Chile, 10 years for Cuba and Brazil, and 11 years for Argentina). Only Mexico, at four and a half years, is close to the average time Russia takes to ratify agreements with countries of other regions. Russia has not signed any tax treaties with Latin American countries since 2004.
35 Brazil (1986), Venezuela (1996), Mexico (2002), and Colombia (2012).
36 The U.S. Senate rejected Brazil because it objected to a U.S. investment tax credit for investments by U.S. persons in Brazil and a U.S. deduction for charitable contributions by U.S. persons to Brazilian charities. It rejected Argentina because it objected to a partial override of the U.S. rules allowing the taxation of foreign persons on direct and indirect investments in U.S. real property and the lack of an anti-treaty-shopping provision. See Rocco V. Femia and Layla J. Aksakal, “The Use of Tax Treaty Status in Legislation and the Impact on U.S. Tax Treaty Policy,” Tax Notes Int’l, Apr. 26, 2010, p. 341 .
37 Citing privacy concerns about U.S. tax data, Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., has single-handedly blocked Senate action on several tax treaties that have been awaiting Senate review since 2011. See Patrick Temple-West, “Senator Paul Stirs Business Ire Over Blocking of Tax Treaties,” Reuters, Apr. 28, 2013. The Chile-U.S. treaty was reported favorably to the full Senate by the Foreign Affairs Committee, but it was unclear at the publication of this article whether it would be approved by the full Senate over Rand’s objections.
38 Like the Andean Pact, CARICOM also has a multilateral treaty (1994) with Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guiana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago as members.
39 Barbados: Venezuela (1998), Cuba (1999), Mexico (2008), and Panama (2010).
Trinidad and Tobago: Venezuela (1996) and Brazil (2008).
40 Brazil (1991), Venezuela (2001), Cuba (2001), Mexico (2005), Ecuador (2013), and Chile (2015).
41 India: Brazil (1988), Mexico (2007), Colombia (2011), and Uruguay (2011).
Australia: Argentina (1999), Mexico (2002), and Chile (2010).
42 Mexico (1994), Panama (2010), Ecuador (2013), and Uruguay (2015). The tax agreements with Ecuador and Uruguay have not entered into force.
43 Kuwait-Venezuela (2004), Iran-Venezuela (2005), Qatar-Venezuela (2006), Cuba-Qatar (2006), Kuwait-Mexico (2009), Panama-Qatar (2010), Bahrain-Mexico (2010), U.A.E.-Venezuela (2010), Ecuador-Iran (2011), Mexico-Qatar (2012), Panama-U.A.E. (2012), Mexico-U.A.E. (2012), U.A.E.-Uruguay (2014), Ecuador-Qatar (2014), and Saudi Arabia-Venezuela (2015). All except the last are in force.
44 Mexico (1999), Brazil (2002), and Panama (2012).
45 Brazil (2003), Mexico (2009), Chile (2012), and Uruguay (2015). The treaty with Uruguay has not entered into force.